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In this thesis, a new protocol is proposed for the Bluetooth Key Exchange. The 
proposed key exchange will make use of a public-key algorithm as compared to 
the currently existing key exchange which only uses symmetric ciphers. The 
public-key algorithm to be used is a modified version of the RSA algorithm called 
"Unbalanced RSA". The proposed scheme will improve on the currently existing 
key exchange scheme by improving the security while trying to minimize 
computation time. The proposed protocol will also improve on a recent work 
which used the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for Bluetooth key exchange. In using the 
Diffie-Hellman algorithm the security was increased from the original Bluetooth 
key exchange but the computation time and difficulty of computations was also 
increased. Two Bluetooth devices that are trying to communicate can have a 
wide range of processor speeds and the use of the Diffie-Hellman protocol can 
cause a large delay at one user. The use of Unbalanced RSA in the proposed 
protocol will aim to remedy this problem. The aim of the proposed protocol is to 
eliminate the security risks from the original Bluetooth key exchange and also 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless network communication has been paid more and more attention 
during the past decade since it makes it much easier to access a network 
compared to its wired counterparts. On one hand, wireless networks can provide 
great convenience for the people in communication; one the other hand, it 
proposes a tougher task of network security since it also make it much easier for 
an attacker to intercept a message transmitted in wireless. There are many types 
of wireless networks, for example, wireless LAN (WLAN), wireless MAN (WMAN), 
wireless PAN (WPAN), and ad hoc wireless network. In this thesis, the security of 
WPAN is our main concern. 
In recent years the Wireless Personal Area Network or WPAN has 
become a popular method for two devices in close proximity to exchange 
information. The WPAN consists of technologies such as Infrared (IR), Bluetooth, 
UWB, and Zigbee. When PAN first became popular IR technology was the 
popular way to exchange information between two wireless devices [1]. Infrared 
technology uses wireless technology in devices that convey data through IR 
radiation. IR technology is used for short and medium range communication. 
Many devices operate in the "line-of-sight mode", which means that the two 
devices must have a straight line of sight between them. This is not very helpful 
for people who are always on the move. Another mode for infrared devices is 
called the scatter mode where a device does not have to be in direct sight of the 
device but has to be in the same room or just outside the room with a door open. 
Another limitation of IR technology is that its signal cannot pass through walls so 
it cannot communicate between two different rooms in a house. Nowadays 
Infrared is being phased out of devices in exchange for Bluetooth (BT) 
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technology. BT technology improves on the mobility of infrared devices by 
allowing users to be farther away and in different rooms when they are 
exchanging information. Bluetooth can allow devices to be up to 100 meters 
away and still be able to connect to one another [2]. It also allows for a data 
transmission rate of up to 3 megabits per second. Overall, Bluetooth is a good 
solution to the problems faced by infrared technologies and that is why it is taking 
over as the predominant technology for wireless file transfer. 
Over the past few years the number of Bluetooth users has increased 
rapidly. From 2003 to 2006, the number of Bluetooth users has nearly doubled 
every year going from 125 million to 1 billion users as predicted by the November 
2006 issue of SDA magazine and [3]. The number of Bluetooth equipped devices 
keeps increasing. In 2009, 80% of mobile phones will be Bluetooth enabled [4]. 
According to Microsoft, in 2008, greater than 54% of all laptops that are shipped 
are equipped with Bluetooth technology. As of right now Bluetooth is not really 
being used for exchanging very vital information. As more powerful devices 
become equipped with Bluetooth, it will be used to exchange important 
information and therefore there needs to be no uncertainty in the security of 
Bluetooth. Bluetooth security right now is acceptable for the way it is being used 
but as Bluetooth is being used to exchange secretive information, the security 
needs to be improved. 
Security in Bluetooth is a major issue and failure to use proper security 
measures can cause several problems for Bluetooth users. First of all, the 
Bluetooth standard describes three modes of security which are shown in Table 
1.1 [5]. Modes 2 and 3 require two devices to complete the pairing process 







Service Level Security. 
Link Level Security. 
Table 1.1: Bluetooth Security Modes 
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Failure to employ a proper mode of security can lead to several vulnerabilities in 
the Bluetooth device. These vulnerabilities are listed below [5]: 
• Sensitive data is available for browsing 
• An attacker can use a compromised telephone to make calls 
• Denial of Service attacks can be launched against the compromised 
device 
• Address lists can be downloaded 
• Malware can be installed for later infection of other devices, including 
network attached systems 
• An attacker can install malware with the intent to gain ongoing control of 
the device 
To combat these vulnerabilities several different approaches can be taken. 
First of all one should not operate Bluetooth Devices in Mode 1 because no 
security is provided. Also when Bluetooth is not being used, turn it off so that it is 
not discoverable. Turn it on when trying to connect to somebody. An easy way to 
ensure that the device is safe is to minimize the distance between it and the other 
Bluetooth device. It is also a good idea to install anti-virus software to keep you 
safe from Malware. These Bluetooth vulnerabilities have already been addressed 
and users for the most part are aware of them and can combat them. Some types 
of attacks on Bluetooth however use complex methods to obtain confidential 
information. These attacks are known as passive eavesdropping, active 
eavesdropping, and bluedumping. These attacks occur during the key exchange 
operation and obtain the link keys so that the attacker can decrypt all information 
sent form one device to the other. In [6] the author agrees that eavesdropping 
attacks are a major problem in current Bluetooth security. The key exchange 
scheme proposed in this Thesis will help to fight against these attacks. 
The scheme proposed in this Thesis uses public-key cryptography during 
the Bluetooth key exchange to provide better security while also trying to 
minimize the time delay. The proposed scheme will help to protect against the 
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common key exchange attacks of passive eavesdropping, active eavesdropping, 
and bluedumping because of the use of public-key cryptography. The proposed 
algorithm uses a slightly modified version of the RSA algorithm which has 
considerably smaller time delay than other public-key algorithms while still 
providing a high level of security. 
The next chapter reviews the existing Bluetooth Privacy and key exchange 
schemes. Chapter 3 revisits previously proposed work on the Bluetooth key 
exchange using public-key cryptography. Chapter 4 reviews the RSA algorithm, 
and introduces a modified version of RSA known as "Unbalanced RSA". The new 
protocol using Unbalanced RSA is proposed in chapter 5. This chapter will also 
discuss the security aspects of the proposed protocol. Chapter 6 will go over in 
detail the simulation results and also provides analysis on these results. 
Conclusions and ideas for future work are given in the final chapter. 
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2. An Overview on Bluetooth 
Privacy and Key Exchange 
IEEE 802.15 is a working group of the IEEE 802, which specializes in 
Wireless Personal Area Networks. This chapter focuses on the security portion of 
the IEEE 802.15 standard and more specifically on the Key exchange. 
2.1 An Overview of Bluetooth 
Bluetooth was created by Ericsson in 1994 to essentially replace wired 
networks. In 1998 another step was taken and a Bluetooth special interest group 
(SIG) was formed, the founders were from Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Toshiba and 
Nokia [7]. By the year 2004 Bluetooth was already supported by over 2100 
companies all over the world [8]. Bluetooth allows devices to connect and 
exchange information without any wires or external devices. The only 
requirement is that the device is Bluetooth enabled. Bluetooth has many different 
uses and is used in a variety of devices such as cell phones, laptops, printers, 
headsets, video games etc. The introduction of Bluetooth has been quite 
revolutionary and actually helps people in everyday life. The use of Bluetooth 
enabled headsets, allows people to connect the headset to their phone so they 
can take calls even while driving without getting distracted from the road. 
Bluetooth does of course have a limited range and the range is not that of a 
WLAN. However, depending on the class of the device being used the range can 
be quite good. For example, for a Bluetooth headset, a large range is not 
required therefore a class 2 or 3 device can be used which can provide up to 10 
meter range. However, for a laptop, a larger range is required so a class 1 device 
with 100m range would be appropriate [9]. Prior to Bluetooth, Infrared technology 
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was commonly used to exchange information between two wireless devices. This 
technology proved to be quite rudimentary when compared to Bluetooth. With IR 
technology, the two devices usually had to have a direct line of sight to one 
another or there couldn't be any walls or other obstacles between them [10]. 
Once Bluetooth was introduced IR technology was quickly faded out. 
Another wireless service that has constantly been compared to Bluetooth 
is Wireless internet (WLAN). Wireless internet or Wi-Fi is very common these 
days and is standard in laptops. Bluetooth is different from Wi-Fi in that it does 
not require any external products in order to be used. The only requirement is 
that the two devices have the Bluetooth technology and can connect to one 
another and exchange information. The similarity between Bluetooth and Wi-Fi is 
that they are both used in households and offices. Wi-Fi covers a wider range 
than Bluetooth, whereas Bluetooth is less expensive and has lower power 
consumption [11]. In general, Bluetooth is efficient for exchanging small files or 
documents when two devices are in close proximity of one another. 
Security concerns play a major role in Bluetooth technology. The goal of 
Bluetooth security is to allow devices to connect to one another and/or exchange 
information without being compromised. In the early years of Bluetooth, there 
were some very lethal attacks such as bluejacking, bluesnarfing, or bluebugging 
which enabled attackers to use the Bluetooth device without the user's 
knowledge [12]. However, security patches have been used to remedy these 
problems [13]. In recent years Bluetooth security has become a more serious 
issue as it is being used to exchange confidential information. The main issue is 
the key exchange process where an attacker can use passive/active 
eavesdropping or bluedumping attack to obtain secret keys. Once an attacker is 
able to obtain the secret keys he/she will be able to decrypt all information being 
sent between the two Bluetooth devices. These attacks will be discussed in a 
later section and how they can be used to obtain the secret keys. The next 
section will go over the initial stages of Bluetooth security. The third section will 
review the Bluetooth key exchange process as well as the attacks possible on the 
key exchange. 
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2.2 Bluetooth Security 
The Bluetooth Security process consists of Key generation and 
Initialization followed by encrypting and sending of messages. The initialization 
process is the fundamental base of Bluetooth security because that is where the 
secret keys are created and exchanged. The focus of this thesis will be on the 
first three parts of the initialization process and more specifically the key 
exchange. The initialization process consists of five steps [14]: 
1) generation of initialization key 
2) generation of link key 
3) link key exchange 
4) authentication 
5) generation of encryption key 
The first three steps of the initialization process make up the key exchange and 
that is where the main focus will be. Prior to discussing the initialization process a 
brief discussion on Bluetooth security services will be provided. 
2.2.1 Security Services 
Bluetooth provides five different kinds of security services using different 
kinds of mechanisms. The five security services provided by Bluetooth are 
authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-
repudiation. Authentication is provided through a challenge-response scheme in 
which the claimant is asked to prove its knowledge of the secret key using a 
symmetric cipher. The authentication procedure uses the AES candidate 
SAFER+ as its base and modifies it to fit the needs of Bluetooth [14]. Access 
control is provided to Bluetooth through the use of PIN numbers entered in the 
devices. When two devices are trying to connect to one another it is required that 
they each enter the same PIN in their devices so that it is known that these 
devices want to be matched with one another. If the same PINs are not entered 
into the devices they will not be allowed to connect to one another. Data 
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confidentiality is provided through an encryption scheme. The encryption of the 
payload information is done by a stream cipher. The key stream generator will 
generate and stream through the key which will then be XORed with the plain text 
or cipher text depending on whether encryption or decryption is being performed. 
In order to make sure data integrity is maintained Bluetooth has many error 
codes which will occur if there is any problem with the two devices that are trying 
to communicate. These error codes are used to inform the parties if the message 
could not be delivered for some reason. The errors will let the parties know what 
problem has occurred so that they can fix it and resend the data. The unique 
address of each Bluetooth device provides accountability in terms of the last 
security service, non-repudiation. 
2.2.2 Key Types 
There are four different key types that can be used as an authentication 
key, encryption key, or initialization key. The four different key types [14] are 1) 
Combination key (K1-2, K2-i), Unit Key (Kunit), Temporary Key (Kmaster), and 
Initialization key (Kit1it). The unit key Kunit is derived solely from information from 
Bluetooth Device 1. The combination Key is derived from information in both 
Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth Device 2 (BD2). The master key Kmaster 
will be used during the session currently in progress and it will replace the original 
link key temporarily. The initialization key is used during the initialization process 
before any combination or unit keys have been defined or exchanged. 
Initialization key is derived from a PIN code and a device address. The PIN can 
be a fixed number that came with the device or can be selected by the user and 
entered into both devices that are trying to connect to one another. 
2.2.3 Key Generation 
For authentication purposes there are two different algorithms used for 
generating keys. In figure 2.1 both these algorithms are shown as well as their 
inputs and outputs. When trying to generate a unit key or combination key the E21 
function is used, this will produce a 128-bit key using a 128-bit random number 
8 
and 48-bit address. When trying to generate an initialization key or a master key 
the E22 function is used, this will produce a 128-bit key from a 128-bit random 




























Figure 2.1: BT Key Generating Algorithm E2 [14] 
Figure 2.2 shows how the encryption key is generated using the E3 algorithm. 
The E3 algorithm produces 128-bit key using a 128-bit random number, a 96-bit 
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Figure 2.2: Generation of BT encryption key [14] 
9 
2.2.4 Initialization Key 
The initialization key is generated using the E22 algorithm. This algorithm 
takes as input the device address, PIN code, length of PIN (in octets), and a 
random number. During each authentication process a new random number will 
be issued to provide better security. It is also possible to do mutual authentication 
so that each device knows exactly who it is communicating with. Once a 
successful authentication has been completed an auxiliary parameter, the 
authenticated ciphering offset (ACO) will be computed and the ACO will be used 
for ciphering key generation. 
2.2.5 Unit Key 
To generate a unit key the only information that is needed is from 
Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1). Figure 2.3 below shows how BD1 will send the unit 
key to BD2 so that they can communicate with each other. As can be seen from 
the figure, BD1 will generate Kunit and then XOR with the initialization key so that 
Kunit is not transported in the clear. Although this is a very simple encryption it 
does provide some type of security. Once the encrypted key reaches BD2, it will 
decrypt the key by XORing it with the initialization key to obtain Kunit, which 





-* K, nit 
Figure 2.3: Generation of BT Unit Key [14] 
2.2.6 Combination Key 
When generating a combination key it is slightly more complicated than 
generating a unit key because both Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth 
Device 2 (BD2) need to be involved in the generation and they both need the 
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others information. Figure 2.4 below gives a diagrammed version of the steps 
that need to be taken in order to create a combination key K1-2. Firstly, BD1 will 
create its part of the combination key AK_Ki by inputting a random number 
(AK_RANDi) and the address of BD1 (BD_ADDR1) into the E21 algorithm. Once 
BD1 has created A K J ^ it will create C1 by XORing AK_RAND! and the 
initialization key. Once this is completed BD1 will send C1 to BD2. On the other 
side BD2 will be calculating AK_K2 and C2 using another random number 
(AK_RAND2), device address of BD2 (BD_ADDR2), and the initialization key 
(Kinit). Once BD2 completes its calculations it will send C2 to device BD1. Once 
BD1 receives C2 it can calculate AK_RAND2 by taking C2 and XORing it with Kinit. 
Now that BD1 knows AK_RAND2 it can calculate AK_K2 by putting AK_RAND2 
and BD_ADDR2 into the E2i algorithm. BD1 now has AK_K2, it can calculate the 
combination key which is done by XORing AK_Ki with AK_K2 to obtain K-i-2. 
Device B does exactly the same thing to calculate AK_Ki and then it will XOR 
AK_Ki and AK_K2 to obtain K2_i which is the same as Ki_2. The combination key 
is by far the commonly used method to obtain a Bluetooth link key. 
BDl BD2 
AK_K2=E2i(AK_RAND2, BD_ADDR2) 
C2 = AK_RAND2 XOR KM, 
A K _ R A N D I = Ci XOR K 
AK_Ki=E2i(AK_RANDA, B D _ A D D R A ) 
K2 . I = AK_Ki XOR AK_I<2 = K1.2 
Figure 2.4: Generation of BT Combination Key [14] 
AK_Ki=E2,(AK_RAND,, BD_ADDR,) 
Q = AK_RANDi XOR K ^ 
AK_RAND2 = C2 XOR Kinit 
AK_K2=E2i(AK_RAND2, BD_ADDR2) 
Ki_2 = AK_Ki XOR AK_K2 
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2.2.7 Master/Temporary Key 
The process for generating a master key for the current session is a little 
bit simpler than that for a combination key. When the master (BD1) wants to 
create a master key and deliver it to BD2 it follows the steps outlined in Figure 
2.5 below. The figure shows that Bluetooth Device 1 will first calculate Kmaster by 
using the E22 algorithm with inputs of 2 random numbers and the length of the 
random number in octets. The next step is for BD1 to send a random number to 
BD2. This number is used to calculate a value called the overlay, which is 
obtained by inputting the link key, the random number and the length of the 
random number into the E22 algorithm. BD1 will also calculate this overlay and 
then the overlay and the master key will be XORed together to form C. The value 
C will be sent to BD2 and it can now XOR the overlay it calculated with the value 
C that was sent in order to obtain Kmaster. 
BDl BD2 
Kmas,er = E22(RAND1,RAND2,16) 
OVL = E22(K,RAND,16) 
C = OVLXORKm aster 
OVL = E22(K,RAND,16) 
K „ B = OVLXORC 
Figure 2.5: Generation of BT Master Key [14] 
2.3 Bluetooth Key exchange 
The Bluetooth key exchange combines the first three steps of the key 
generation and initialization process. It includes the generation of an initialization 
key by both devices, the generation of link keys, and the exchange of link keys. 
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Figure 2.6 shows these three steps together in one diagram. This is the entire 
process which will be replaced with the proposed protocol. 
BT Device 1 BT Device 2 
Enters PIN 
Generates Rink-RND 
Kini, = E22(Rini., PIN, L) 
Generates R i=RND 
CA — Ri XOR Kinit 
R2—C2 XOR Kinit 
Ki=E2 i(Ri, IDBD1) 
K2=E2i(R2, IDBD2) 
K1.2 = Ki XOR K2 
Enters PIN 
Ki n i t=E 2 2(Ri n i t ,PIN !L) 
Generates R2=RND 
C B = R 2 XOR Kinit 
Ri—Oi XOR Knit 
K2=E21(RAND2 , IDBD2) 
Ki=E2i(Ri, IDBD1) 
Jv2-i = ^-1 -X.OK. 1V2 
Figure 2.6: Bluetooth Key Exchange 
The first step in the Bluetooth key exchange scheme is for the two users to 
enter the agreed upon PIN into each of their respective devices. Once the PINs 
have been entered into the devices, the two devices connect to one another. 
These two devices will be called Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth device 
2 (BD2). BD1 will generate a random number Rinit using a random number 
generator. Rinit will be used to generate the initialization key. Once BD1 generates 
Rinit it will send it to BD2. Now that both devices have Rinit they can calculate the 
initialization key (Kinit) using the E22 function. The input to the E22 function will be 
the Rinit, PIN, and L (length of PIN), which will produce the output Kinit- Once both 
devices have obtained the Kinit they have to begin the process for exchanging the 
Link Key. BD1 and BD2 will generate the random numbers R1 and R2 
respectively. The next steps are almost the same as generating a combination 
key. BD1 and BD2 will generate C1 and C2 respectively by XORing the 
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initialization key with the random numbers they generated. BD1 will then send Ci 
to BD2 and BD2 will send C2 to BD1. Using C2, BD1 will obtain R2 and similarly 
BD2 will obtain Ri. Both devices now have Ri and R2 as well as IDBD1 and 
IDBD2. They each generate Ki (Ki=E2i(Ri, IDBD1)) and K2 (K2=E2i(R2, IDBD2)). 
By XORing Ki and K2, they have each obtained the shared link key. 
2.3.1 Attacks on Bluetooth Key Exchange 
In the early years of Bluetooth technology, several flaws were found in its 
implementation. These flaws were known as bluejacking, bluesnarfing, and 
bluebugging. Bluejacking is the sending of unwanted messages through 
Bluetooth to Bluetooth-enabled devices such as mobile phones and laptops [15]. 
Bluesnarfing allows users to access the information on a wireless device through 
a Bluetooth connection. Bluebugging allows a user to take control of the victim's 
Bluetooth enabled phone to make calls or send text messages. Bluesnarfing and 
Bluejacking are illegal in most countries and these attacks are usually only 
possible on older Bluetooth-enabled devices as the newer devices have updated 
software to avoid these problems. 
Although these problems were of concern back then they have for the 
most part been taken care of. However, there is still one major problem that 
needs to be addressed. This major problem is the transfer of confidential 
information. With the pairing scheme in place right now, it would not be difficult 
for a person to eavesdrop (passively or actively) on a connection between two 
Bluetooth devices and obtain the link key. In [16] it was noted that Bluetooth had 
three major vulnerabilities: 1) Spoofing through keys, 2) Spoofing through 
address, and 3) PIN Length. The key exchange plays a major role in trying to 
counter these vulnerabilities and with the system in place now it is not too difficult 
to attack. In [17], [18], [19], [20] it is documented the use of only a PIN as secret 
entity is not sufficient to provide total security and a better pairing scheme is 




If a person is trying to send confidential information through Bluetooth, a 
passive eavesdropper would only need to find out the PIN both devices are using 
in order to be able to decrypt the messages being sent back and forth. Let's start 
at the very beginning. In order for the two devices to connect they need to 
establish a PIN that they both enter into their devices. Usually these PINs are 4 
digit numbers and therefore are not that difficult to figure out. If an eavesdropper 
is able to obtain this PIN he can follow through all the Bluetooth security steps to 
obtain the encryption key that is going to be used. A figure of a passive 
eavesdropping attack is shown in Figure 2.7. 
BT Device 1 
Enters PIN 
Generates Rinit=RND 
Kinit = E22(Rini,, PIN, L) 
Generates R i=RND 
CA = R I XOR Kinit 
R 2 =C 2 XORK i n i , 
Ki=E 2 i (Ri ,ADDRi) 
K2=E2 i (R2 ,ADDR2) 
K1-2 = Ki XOR K2 
Rin 
Connected 





Kinit =E22(Rattk, PIN, L) 
Generates R 2 =RND 
CB —R2 XOR Knit 
R i=C,XORKi„ i t 
K2=E21(R2,ADDR2) 
Ki=E 2 i (Ri ,ADDRi) 
K2.1 = Ki X O R K2 
Figure 2.7: Passive eavesdropping attack on Bluetooth Key exchange 
The steps an eavesdropper would use are as follows: 
1. Obtain PIN by guess or obtaining from use 
2. intercept random number sent from one Bluetooth device to another 
3. Use random number to derive initialization key through the E22 function 
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4. Use initialization key and combination key format to obtain random 
numbers from both Bluetooth device users 
5. Use random numbers to derive the portions of the authentication key 
from both users (AK_K=E2i(RAND, ADDR)) 
6. Use AK_Ki and AK_K2 to obtain the link key (K|ink = AK_Ki XOR 
AK_K2) 
7. eavesdroppers can put link key through authentication scheme to 
obtain SRES and compare it with the SRES of the Bluetooth devices 
8. The link key is then put through E3 function along with the COF and a 
random number to obtain the ciphering key 
9. The ciphering key is input to the payload key generator 
10. The payload key is then input to the key stream generator and the key 
stream is generated 
11. The eavesdropper can now use the key stream and XOR it with the 
cipher text to obtain all the plaintext. 
Active Eavesdropping 
An active eavesdropper is similar to a passive eavesdropper with one 
exception; an active eavesdropper will actually go in and alter messages being 
sent from one user to the other. An active eavesdropper will alter messages so 
that it seems as though the BT users are communicating with the right person but 
actually there is an attacker intercepting their messages and altering them. Figure 
2.8 below shows that two Bluetooth devices are trying to create a combination 
key. However there is an attacker intercepting the messages and altering them to 
make it seem like the two devices are still communicating with each other. This 
type of attack is also known as the man-in-the-middle attacks. 
In this scheme the attacker starts intercepting the messages after the PINs 
are entered by both users. As the diagram shows, every message that is 
supposed to go from Device 1 to Device 2 is intercepted by the attacker and the 
attacker then sends its own message to device 2. Same thing happens when 
device 2 is sending a message to device 1. All the items that are bolded and 
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italicized in the figure are the ones that are manipulated by the attacker. The 
figure shows that the two Bluetooth devices still believe they are speaking to the 
correct person without any interference because they are receiving the proper 
messages. The attacker is the only device with all the proper values and at the 
end after the attacker performs the same process on authentication he/she will be 
able to decrypt any messages exchanges between Device 1 and Device 2. This 
attack also ensures that any message sent from device 1 to device 2 will not be 
decrypted by device 2 since it did not receive the proper values during key 
exchange. In passive eavesdropping however, device 2 is still able to decrypt the 
messages sent by device 1 because none of the information during key 
exchange had been altered. 
BT Device 1 
Enters PIN 
Generates Rinit=RND 
Ki„i, = E22(Rimt, PIN, L) 
Generates R i=RND 
C A = R i X O R K i n i t 
R-2 — Cattk XOR Kinit 
Ki=E 2 1 (R, ,ADDR,) 
K2-^2\{R.2, ADDR2) 
K1-2 = Ki XOR K2 
Connected 










CB =R2 XOR KM, 




Figure 2.8: Man-in-the-middle attack on BT Key Exchange 
Passive and Active Eavesdropping (bluedumping) 
A combination of passive and active eavesdropping is called bluedumping. 
This attack causes a Bluetooth device to unload its stored link key to a specific 
device, which forces these two devices to perform their key exchange and 
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therefore the attacker has another opportunity to eavesdrop and obtain the pairs 
link key [21]. The process of this attack is quite simple. The attacker will send one 
of the Bluetooth devices a message claiming to be another device and claiming 
to have lost the pairs link key. Once the Bluetooth device receives this message, 
it will reinitiate the key exchange with the other Bluetooth device. This will give 
the attacker an opportunity to see the messages and obtain the link key. Again 
this attack does depend on the attacker being able to obtain the PIN that is 
entered into both BT devices. 
2.4 Summary 
Bluetooth security in the past has been adequate for the users of 
Bluetooth. It provides users with the basic security services of authentication, 
access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation. The 
current key exchange scheme may not be adequate in the near future as 
Bluetooth becomes commonly used for transferring important and confidential 
information. The key generation and key exchange process can be a weak link in 
the Bluetooth security architecture, which could lead to the leaking of confidential 
information. 
The main objective of an attack on the key exchange portion of Bluetooth 
security is to obtain the link key that is created. The three types of attack 
described above are the main ways to obtain a link key from two unsuspecting 
Bluetooth devices. As can be seen from the above explanations the security of 
the key exchange depends purely on the secrecy of the PIN. Most Bluetooth 
users tend to use easy PINs and therefore making it not too difficult to crack the 
PIN. For example in 2005 it was found that to crack a 4-digit PIN on Pentium IV 
computer took only 0.063 seconds [22]. 
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3. Recent Work on Bluetooth Key 
Exchange 
A new proposal was introduced in 2004 to improve the Bluetooth key 
exchange scheme by Selim Aissi, Christian Gehrmann, and Kaisa Nyberg [23]. 
The authors of this protocol were from Intel, Ericsson and Nokia. This protocol 
proposed to use Diffie-Hellman in order to exchange the link keys between two 
Bluetooth devices. This protocol uses Diffie-Hellman and Hash functions to 
enhance the security of the link key while still allowing devices to have user-
friendly PINs. It would provide strong protection against off-line attacks (passive 
eavesdropping), active eavesdropping and bluedumping. 
3.1 Security Enhancement Using DH scheme 
The Diffie-Hellman scheme was first published by Whitfield Diffie and 
Martin Hellman in 1976 [24]. The paper was the first that clearly defined public-
key cryptography. The objective of Diffie-Hellman is to enable two users to safely 
exchange a key that can be used later for encryption of messages. The following 
steps are taken to exchange a key using Diffie-Hellman [25]: 
1. A prime number q is selected and given to both users 
2. a is chosen which is smaller than q; a must be a primitive root of q 
and given to both users 
3. User A selects private key XA 
4. User A calculates public key YA= (a
AXA) mod q 
5. User A sends YA to User B 
6. User B selects private key XB 
7. User A calculates public key YB= (QAXB) mod q 
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8. User B sends YB to User A 
9. User A generates secret key S = (YB
AXA) mod q 
10. User B generates secret key S = (YAAXB) mod q 
Once these steps are completed both users have the shared secret key S which 
can now be used for encryption of messages the users would like to send to one 
another. The use of private and public keys makes this scheme less susceptible 
to certain types of attacks. 
The Diffie-Hellman enhanced key exchange protocol makes use of 
cryptographic one-way functions and hash functions to protect it from certain 
types of attacks. Although it does increase the number of protocol steps from 3 to 
4, the level of security is increased. The DH protocol consists of two stages the 
registration stage and the key establishment stage. The registration stage 
contains the initial key generation, exchange of identities, and exchange of 
cryptographic verification values [23]. The key establishment stage consists of 




generates x = DH Key 
computes gx = public key 
Generates K=RND 
Computes C=MAC(K,gx) 
stores x, gx, K, C, IDBD2 
enters PIN 
Stores C, K, IDBD1 
enters PIN 
Figure 3.1: Enhanced BT Key exchange using DH Phase 1 
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Phase 1 will take place at Bluetooth Device 1. It starts off with Bluetooth 
device 1 (BD1) generating its private key x. After the generation of its private key, 
BD1 computes the public key gx mod q. BD1 now needs to generate a random 
number for the authentication key (K) which will be used as the key to the MAC 
function. The next step for BD1 is to generate a message digest using a MAC 
function. The message digest is created by using the K as the key and the 
message used to create the message digest is gx. Once all these steps are taken 
care of, BD1 will store x, gx, K, C, and IDBD2. BD1 will securely transfer the 
values of C and K to BD2 using its online interface. User of BD2 will enter these 
values into its device and store them. 
Prior to the beginning of phase 2 several steps need to be taken. First of 
all, both users for the Bluetooth devices need to agree upon a PIN. Once the PIN 
has been agreed upon, the users enter the PINs into their respective Bluetooth 
devices. Once the PINs have been verified, the connection is established. The 
next step is for BD2 to send its address (IDBD2) to BD1. In return, BD1 will send 
a message to BD2 containing its public key (gx) and its address (IDBD1). BD2 will 
now try to compute the same message digest as BD1 by using the key it received 
earlier (K) and the gx it was sent (C = MAC(K,gx)). After the computation, BD2 
will compare the calculated C to the C it has stored. If both values are the same 
then BD2 will send a success message to BD1. 
Phase 2 can now start after the C and C have been confirmed to be the 
same. At the beginning of phase 2, BD2 generates it private key, y. BD2 will now 
use this key to generate its public key (gy mod q). After the calculation of the 
public key, BD2 will compute a key (K') by using the key derivation function 
(KDF). The KDF is simply a hash function which takes as input a variable size 
message and outputs a fixed size message. BD2 will compute K' by using the 
authentication key (K' = KDF(K)). BD2 will finally calculate the link key using all 
the values it has. The link key is also calculated by using the key derivation 
function (KLink = KDF(PIN,S, C K, IDBD1, IDBD2)). After all these steps have 
been completed, BD2 sends a message to BD1 containing gy and EK(K,IDBD2). 
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EK(K,IDBD2) is simply an XOR encryption function that is encrypting K and 
IDBD2 using K' as the key. At the conclusion of this step phase 2 is finished. 
BDl BD2 
Phase III: 
Computes S=gxy =DH Shared 
Computes K'=KDF(S) 
Computes Klink=KDF (PIN,S, C K, 
IDBD1,IDBD2) 
Decrypts received EK(S,IDBD2) 
if decrypted K = stored K then 
accept KLink 
Establish Connection 
BD2 Sends IDBD2 
BDl Sends gx, IDBD1 
Success (C=C) 
BD2 sends gy, 
Er(S,IDBD2) 
Computes C = MAC(K,gx) 
Compares C and C 
Phase II: 
Generates y=RND=DH Key 
Computes S=gxy =DH Shared 
Computes K'=KDF(S) 
Computes Kiink=KDF (PIN.S, C 
K,IDBD1,IDBD2) 
Figure 3.2: Enhanced BT Key exchange using DH Phase 2and 3 
Phase 3 begins with BD1 computing K' in the same way that BD2 did (K' = 
KDF(K)). After the calculation of K', BD1 will generate the link key once again in 
the same manner as BD2 (KLink = KDF(PIN,S, C K, IDBD1, IDBD2)). The final 
calculation for BD1 is to decrypt the message that was sent by BD2 
(E(c(K,IDBD2)) to recover the value of K. When BD1 recovers the value of K it will 
compare it to the stored value of K it has. If the stored value of K matches the 
decrypted value of K then BD1 will accept the value of Kunk-
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3.2 Security Analysis 
The Diffie-Hellman protocol was proposed in order to avoid the security 
risks present in the original Bluetooth key exchange scheme. As was mentioned 
earlier, the main security threats were passive eavesdropping, active 
eavesdropping, and bluedumping. 
In the passive eavesdropping attack, the attacker will not be changing any 
messages. They will just be trying to obtain the link key by observing the 
messages being sent from one device to the other. In the Diffie-Hellman protocol, 
the only entities that are exchanged publicly are gx, gy, IDBD1, IDBD2, 
EK(S,IDBD2), and a success signal. The information that an attacker needs to 
obtain the link key is PIN, S, C K, IDBD1, and IDBD2. An eavesdropper would be 
able to obtain IDBD1 and IDBD2 by simply listening to the conversation. The PIN 
of course is again a problem. The attacker needs to be able to guess the PIN 
somehow because there is no real way to calculate it unless you go through all 
possibilities. The shared secret S is also a problem because the attacker will 
need to find out either user 1's or user 2's private key in order to calculate S. 
Since these values are generated randomly, it would be quite difficult. The 
values of C and K are usually exchanged between the two devices right when 
they discover one another and an attacker would have to be present and waiting 
for these devices to connect to be able to get these values. Another option would 
be for the user to enter the values of C and K to the second BT device using 
human operable interface [23]. This way it would not be possible for the hacker to 
obtain these values. The Diffie-Hellman enhanced protocol would completely 
eliminate the possibility of an off-line attack by using the Diffie-Hellman Key 
Exchange and Hash functions. 
The active eavesdropping attack would have a greater chance of success 
in this protocol. However, it would be quite difficult. The main issue in the man-in-
the-middle attack would be the discovery of the values of C and K and then using 
those values to manipulate the DH public key to match those values. Of course, 
first and foremost, if the attacker is unable to obtain the PIN then the attack will 
be useless. In the DH protocol when BD1 sends gx to BD2, an active 
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eavesdropper would intercept this and for a successful attack would need to find 
another public key that would give the same value of C. If somehow the attacker 
is able to obtain the values of K and C, this would become much easier. The 
values of K and C are exchanged very early and again the attacker would have to 
be present as soon as the two devices discover one another. Another precaution 
would be for BD1 to send the K and C to BD2 using its output interface and the 
user of BD2 would enter the information into the device using the human 
operable interface [23]. With these precautions although it is possible for a man-
in-the-middle attack to work, it is highly unlikely. 
Bluedumping, as was explained earlier, is a combination of active and 
passive eavesdropping [21]. The main portion of this attack relies on initiating a 
new key exchange and then listening to the messages being exchanged. The 
attacker will force the two devices to discard their link keys and start a new key 
exchange. However, it is not necessary for the devices to change any of the 
values they used previously. If new values are not created for everything, then 
the attacker will have an even smaller chance of obtaining the link key because 
the K and C values do not need to be transferred from one device to the other. If 
new values of K and C are used again it will be quite difficult for the attacker to 
obtain these if they are being entered into the Bluetooth device using the human 
operable interface. At the end the success of the bluedumping attack depends on 
the same factors as the passive eavesdropping attack. 
3.3 Problems in Recent Work for BT Key Exchange 
Although it does provide better security than the original Bluetooth key 
exchange, there are some issues with this protocol that could make it undesirable 
for some users. As the protocol diagram shows, each user is required to carry out 
the same amount of computation which can be a problem when one device has a 
processor that is much slower or smaller than the other. For example, if a laptop 
is communicating with a handheld device (cell phone, PDA, etc.), this protocol 
could cause significant delay at the handheld device end and the laptop would 
just have to wait. Another issue would be the increased amount of computations, 
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each user is to perform two modular exponentiations during each key exchange 
again this would cause significant delays at the end of the handheld device. The 
result of these problems would be significant delay for the users with slower or 
less powerful processors which is quite tedious for the user that is trying to 
communicate with them. 
3.4 Summary 
The Diffie-Hellman protocol was able to address some of the issues with 
the original Bluetooth key exchange scheme. This protocol was able to provide 
high security against the passive eavesdropping, active eavesdropping, and 
bluedumping attacks. Although this is a very good feature, it did suffer from some 
undesirable features as well. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol will 
require each Bluetooth device to perform two exponentiations, which will greatly 
increase the difficulty of calculations required as well as the computation time. 
Another issue would be that smaller and slower processors have to perform 
exactly the same computations as their powerful counterparts, which can cause 
an even longer delay. In the next chapter another algorithm is introduced called 
"Unbalanced RSA" which addresses the problems related to the Diffie-Hellman 
protocol. 
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4. RSA and its Modified Version 
This chapter will first go over the basics of the RSA algorithm followed by 
an explanation of the modified version of RSA called "Unbalanced RSA". Finally 
the security features of both RSA and Unbalanced RSA will be reviewed. 
4.1 RSA 
RSA was publicly described the first time in 1977 in a paper written by 
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman for Communications of the ACM [26]. RSA has 
become the most popular approach to public-key encryption. The RSA algorithm 








Prime factors of modulus n (private) 
Public key (public) 
Private Key (private) 
Tab e4.1: RSA entities 
The RSA algorithm is shown in Figure 6.1 on the next page. The figure shows the 
basic idea on how RSA works. One user (User A) will select two prime numbers p 
and q. Using those numbers he will calculate its public and private key. User A 
will then broadcast its public key so User B can obtain it. User B will select a 
message and encrypt it using User A's public key (e) then send the cipher text to 




Select p, q 
Calculate n = p x q 
Calculate 0(n) = (p-1)(q-1) 




p and q are prime 
gcd(<Kn),e)=1;Ke<<|>(n) 
e*d=1 mod <|>(n) 
KU = {e,n} 










M = Cd mod n 
Figure 4.1: RSA Algorithm [27] 
4.2 "Unbalanced RSA" 
"Unbalanced RSA" (URSA) was introduced in a paper called "RSA for 
paranoids" by Adi Shamir in 1995 [28]. In 1995, a modulus size of 512 bits for 
RSA started to become considerably insecure. However, if the modulus size was 
increased some problems could arise. Firstly, by increasing the modulus size, the 
computation complexity and delay would rise very quickly and thus make it 
difficult to choose a modulus size that is efficient and will provide long term 
security. For example, if an RSA encryption operation with a 1024 bit modulus 
takes 1 second, then the same encryption operation with a 5120 bit modulus on 
the same processors would take approximately 2 minutes. Unbalanced RSA will 
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allow people to increase the modulus size to improve security without any time 
penalty. Unbalanced RSA can also be used to keep the modulus size the same 
and decrease the computation time when compared to RSA. 
In the explanation of "Unbalanced RSA" a modulus size of 1024 bits will be 
used as an example as this value is considered a common value for RSA 
modulus. In normal RSA the prime factors for such a modulus would be 512 bits 
each. In Unbalanced RSA however, the two prime factors p and q are 256 and 
768 bits in length respectively. This difference in the size of the prime factors is 
what is being referenced in the name "Unbalanced RSA". A later discussion will 
show why a 1024 bit modulus and its factors of size 256 and 768 in Unbalanced 
RSA are still as secure as normal RSA with its 512 bit factors. 
RSA is usually used to exchange keys for symmetric cryptosystems 
therefore the cleartexts that are being encrypted are usually quite short. Looking 
at the earlier example of p which was 256 bits, it is very unlikely that someone 
would use RSA to exchange a key greater than 256 bits. Even three keys for 
3DES require only 168 bits [28]. An assumption can be made that the cleartext 
that needs to be encrypted is in the range of 0 to p. 
When comparing RSA to Unbalanced RSA one only needs to consider the 
decryption operation because the encryption operation remains the same in both 
cases. In normal RSA, decryption is performed by M = Cd mod n. In Unbalanced 
RSA, decryption is by performed M = Cd mod p. If RSA decryption and 
Unbalanced RSA decryption is compared it will show that the moduli are 1024 
bits and 256 bits respectively. Using these two moduli it can be shown that the 
decryption in RSA will take (1024/256)3=64 times longer than that of URSA [28]. 
The decryption process of Unbalanced RSA is based on the use of the 
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). In normal RSA when trying to decrypt the 
ciphertext using CRT is the most efficient way to do so [29]. The process is split 
up to calculate Mi=Cd mod p and M2 = C
d mod q, where p and q are of the same 
size. For the URSA case where p is 256 bits and q is 768 bits, the calculation of 
M2 would take (768/256)
3 = 27 times as long as the calculation of Mi. The 
purpose of this discussion was to show there is no need to calculate the much 
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more expensive M2. Since the size of the message M is smaller than p, it can be 
concluded that M-i is simply equal to M. This would mean that there is no need to 
calculate the much more expensive M2 in order to retrieve the original message. 
4.3 RSA and "Unbalanced RSA" Security Analysis 
RSA security is mainly dependant on the ability of an attacker to factor the 
modulus n into its prime factors, p and q. These days a normal accepted value of 
an RSA modulus is 1024 bits making the two prime factors 512 bits each. There 
are two types of factoring algorithms that can be used on the modulus of RSA. 
The first type of algorithm is one whose running time depends on the size of the 
factors (Type 1) and the second type of algorithm is one whose running time 
depends on the size of the factored number, n (Type 2). 
The fastest factoring algorithm which depends on the size of the factors is 
the elliptic curve method. This method was invented by Lenstra in 1987 [30], it 
was an improvement on the p-1 method put forward by Pollard [31]. The 
asymptotic running time of this method is exp(0((ln(p))°5- (lnln(p))05)) [28]. 
However, the basic operations of this method are very slow. In 1995 the largest 
factor ever found using the elliptic curve method was 145 bits long. The largest 
factor ever found so far using ECM was 67 digits long [32]. According to Paul 
Zimmerman, using the elliptic curve method should find factors 70 digits long by 
2010 and 85 digits long by 2018 [33]. Therefore, in the near future, it will be very 
unlikely the elliptic curve method will be able to find factors 256 or 512 bits long. 
Factoring algorithms that depend on the size of the factored number are 
much faster because they can use a variety of mathematical techniques. The 
best algorithm of this type is called the general number field sieve. This method 
consists of a sieving step and a matrix step [34]. This algorithm has an 
asymptotic complexity of exp(0((ln(n))1/3- (\n\r\(n))m)) and is said to be able to 
factor a 512 bit modulus 10,000 - 15,000 MlPS-years (1 MlPS-years is about 
31.5 trillion instructions) [28]. 
Since RSA was introduced all major factorizations of the modulus have 
been achieved by the algorithms depending on the size of the modulus. It can be 
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assumed that this trend will continue in the future. The earlier example has 
Unbalanced RSA with the modulus size 1024 bits and the size of p is 256 bits, 
whereas RSA has n being 1024 bits and p being 512 bits. By looking at the 
results of these factoring algorithms it is safe to say that the sizes chosen for the 
URSA entities provide the same level of security as the RSA entities. Since the 
largest factored numbers using ECM is 67 digits long, the p value which 256 bits 
in "Unbalanced RSA" is just as safe as the 512 bit value of RSA. The second type 
of algorithm depends on the size of the modulus and since both RSA and 
Unbalanced RSA have a modulus size of 1024 bits, they are equally secure to 
this type of algorithm. 
By looking at these facts one can say that the "Unbalanced RSA" 
algorithm can be kept as secure as regular RSA if certain conditions are met. If 
the modulus, n, of both algorithms is of the same size then RSA and URSA will 
not be susceptible to a type 2 algorithm because the size of their moduli is the 
same. Now since Unbalanced RSA uses the prime factor p as its decryption 
modulus, the size of the factor should be greater than 67 digits. This is because 
that largest factor found using a type 1 algorithm is 67 digits long. As long as 
these conditions are met, using Unbalanced RSA should not compromise the 
security when comparing it to normal RSA. 
4.4 Application of Unbalanced RSA 
Unbalanced RSA has been proposed to be applied to other wireless 
areas. In [35], [36], it is proposed to use Unbalanced RSA for authentication and 
key distribution in Wireless Local Area Networks. Public-key cryptography needs 
to be used in WLAN because it also suffers from the same security threats as 
Bluetooth (passive and active eavesdropping) [37]. The main idea of this 
proposal was for the client and server in the communication to exchange 
certificates and a shared secret key. The first step is for the client to send its 
certificate to the server, the server will verify the certificate authority's signature 
on the certificate and if approved it will move forward. The server will generate a 
random secret key and encrypt it with the client's public key. This ciphertext 
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would be sent to the client along with the server's certificate. The client will now 
verify the server's certificate and if approved will decrypt the ciphertext to obtain 
the secret key. Once both the client and server have the secret key a finished 
message is sent from client to server. This protocol using Unbalanced RSA 
addresses the flaws in key-distribution and authentication in the 802.11 standard 
and also reduces the time delay for key-distribution. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter the "Unbalanced RSA" algorithm was introduced to show its 
advantages over RSA and Diffie-Hellman. The purpose of "Unbalanced RSA" is 
to decrease the size of decryption modulus in order to reduce computation time, 
while providing the same security level. For example, it was shown that the 
decryption process for "Unbalanced RSA" was 64 times shorter than that of RSA 
when both have a modulus of 1024 bits. "Unbalanced RSA" can also be used to 
greatly increase the security level, by increasing the size of n, while keeping the 
same computation time as RSA. Another advantage of "Unbalanced RSA" is that 
it can be used to let slower and smaller processor do the decryption portion of the 
algorithm so that they don't have to deal with the large modulus size. 
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5. Proposed Bluetooth Key 
Exchange with Unbalanced RSA 
In this chapter the proposed protocol will be introduced. "Unbalanced 
RSA" will be applied to the Bluetooth Key exchange in order to improve the 
security from the original Bluetooth scheme and reduce computation time and 
reduce the number of exponentiations from the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The first 
section will describe the proposed protocol in detail using its three separate 
phases. The next section will describe how the security features of the protocol 
defend against the common key exchange attacks discussed earlier. Lastly the 
three key exchange protocols in various fields will be compared. 
5.1 The Proposed Protocol 
First of all, there are two scenarios that can take place during Bluetooth 
communication. The first scenario is when both devices have human operable 
interfaces or there can be a communication between two devices one of which 
has no human operable interface. The device with no human operable interface 
should have a suitable output interface so that it can display important values to 
the other device. The public keys and message digest are securely transferred to 
each device at the very beginning of the connection between the two devices. 
The proposed protocol consists of three messages being exchanged 
between Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth Device 2 (BD2). Other than 
these messages there are several calculations that take place at each device. 
There are some variables and abbreviations that will be used during this 








Public key, Private key pair for BT device 2 
Modulus used for RSA 
prime factors of modulus n 
MD5 Hash function 
Message authentication code. Input is secret 
key and message, output is MAC 
Random number generator 
Table 5.1: proposed protocol entities 
The public key of BD2 is used only by BD1. BD1 will perform an encryption 
function; BD2 will perform a decryption function. Both devices need to perform 2 
Hash functions and 1 MAC function. Only BD1 will need to generate random 
numbers using the random number generator. Figure's 5.1 and 5.2 show the 
protocol along with all its steps divided into 3 phases. 
5.1.1 Phase 1 
First and foremost, the public key of BD2 is given to BD1 secretly as soon 
as the two devices decide to connect to one another but prior to the entry of the 
PIN. So for example when BD1 discovers BD2 as soon as BD1 chooses to 
connect to BD2 and BD2 accepts, the public key of BD2 (e and n) is sent to BD1. 
Phase 1 (Figure 5.1) of the protocol takes place before the users enter the PINs 
into both BT devices. Phase 1 mainly consists of operations/calculations that do 
not require values from BD2. BD1 will firstly generate a 128-bit random number 
(K) to use as the initialization key. This key will then be encrypted using the public 
key of BD2 (C = (KAe2) mod n). A message digest is calculated using the 
initialization key (K) and the ciphertext C. This message digest will be used later 
for authentication. Once all these values are calculated, BD1 will store K, H, C, 
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and e2. The message digest is secretly sent to the user of BD2. BD2 will store the 
value of H to use at a later time for authentication. Once these operations are 
finished both users have agreed to a PIN and enter the PIN into their respective 
Bluetooth enabled devices. 
BDl BD 2 
Phase I: 
generates K=RND 
computes C=(KAe2) mod n 
computes H=MAC(K, C) 
stores K, H, C, e2 
stores H 
enters PIN enters PIN 
Figure 5.1: Enhanced BT Key exchange using URSA Phase 1 
5.1.2 Phase 2 
After the PINs have been entered, two messages need to be exchanged 
between the users to enable further calculations. BD2 will send its 48-bit address 
to BD1 and BD1 in return will send its address along with the ciphertext, C. Once 
these messages have been exchanged, phase 2 of the protocol can begin. 
Phase 2 takes place entirely on the side of BD2. Firstly, BD2 will decrypt the 
ciphertext to obtain the initialization key. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the 
decryption process is done by using modulus p hence "Unbalanced RSA" is 
being used. After decrypting the ciphertext, BD2 will compute an H' using the 
random key K which was just decrypted and the ciphertext, which was just 
delivered to it following Phase 1. Once H' is calculated, BD2 will then compare 
this value to the H that it was given during the end of phase 1. If H and H' are the 
same, then BD2 knows that it is communicating with BD1 and no changes have 
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been made to the messages being sent. If H and H' did not match BD2 would 
simply shut down the communication and the key exchange would be cancelled 
at that point. Once the message digests match, then the initialization key is used 
to create another key, K'. This key is generated by using the initialization key (K) 
as input to the MD5 hash function. This K' is then XORed with H' and the address 
of BD2 and this value is sent to BD1. The last step in phase 2 is to generate the 
link key which will be used later to obtain an encryption key. The link key, K|ink, is 
generated by entering several values into the MD5 Hash function. The inputs to 
the Hash function are the PIN, K, H, IDBD1, and IDBD2. As can be seen, all 
these values are very important to the generation of the link key and a small error 
in any one of them will cause the devices to have two different link keys. That is 
why these values all need to be checked to ensure their correctness. 
BDl BD2 
Phase III: 




Recovers K' from (K' XOR H' 
XORIDBD2) 
compares recovered K' to stored K' 
if K'=Stored K' then Accept KLink 
Establish Connection 
BD2 Sends IDBD2 
BDl Sends C, IDBD1 
BD2 sends (K' XOR H' 
XOR IDBD2) 
Phase II: 
decrypts C: K=(CAd2) mod p 
computes H'=MAC(K,C) 
compares H and H' to confirm 
BDl's identity 
computes K'=Hash (K) 
BD2 computes (K' XOR H' XOR 
IDBD2) 
KLi„k=Hash(PIN,K>H,IDBD 1 ,IDB 
D2) 
Figure 5.2: Enhanced BT Key exchange using URSA Phase 2 and 3 
5.1.3 Phase 3 
Phase 3 is also shown is Figure 5.2 and will begin prior to the message 
being sent by BD2 to BD1 containing the (K' XOR H' XOR IDBD2) value. The first 
step in phase 3 is to generate the same K' as was done in phase 2. This was 
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done by placing the initialization key (K) into the hash function. Once the K' is 
calculated then BD1 can go on and generate the link key. Once again, this is 
done in the same manner as BD2 where the values of the PIN, K, H, IDBD1, and 
IDBD2 are used as input to the hash function and the output is K|ink- The next 
step in phase 3 is to recover the value of K' from the message that was sent by 
BD2 earlier. This is done by XORing the message with H and IDBD2. Once K' is 
recovered, BD1 will check to see if the K' that was recovered from the message 
is the same K' that was calculated earlier through the hash function. If they are 
the same then BD1 knows that BD2 received the proper value of the initialization 
key or else they could not calculate the same K'. After having gone through the 
entire protocol, both devices know they have the correct values so they can now 
accept the K|ink value and continue with the security process after the key 
exchange. 
5.2 Security analysis 
The proposed protocol possesses many of the same security properties as 
the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The proposed protocol provides high security against 
the common attacks of passive eavesdropping, active eavesdropping and 
bluedumping. As explained earlier the proposed protocol will exchange certain 
values (H and public keys) secretly prior to the entry of the PIN. The combination 
of public-key cryptography as well as HASH/MAC functions provides enough 
security for the near future. 
The passive eavesdropping attack would be almost useless against this 
protocol. As explained earlier certain values are exchanged secretly before entry 
of the PIN. Even if these values were to somehow get compromised a passive 
eavesdropping attack would still be almost impossible. In order to have a 
successful passive attack the attacker would need to obtain the values of H, K, 
PIN, IDBD1, and IDBD2. The values of IDBD1 and IDBD2 can be obtained by 
listening to the messages sent by BD1 and BD2 to one another. The other 
information an attacker would be able to gather is the value of the ciphertext, C, 
and the value of (K' XOR H XOR IDBD2). An attacker will not be able to obtain 
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the value of the initialization key K from C because it can only be properly 
decrypted with the private key of BD2. Since the attacker cannot obtain K it 
therefore cannot obtain K' because in order to get K', K is to be entered into to 
the Hash function. K' is needed to be able to recover the value of H from the 
message of (K' XOR H' XOR IDBD2). Then the attacker still has the issue of 
somehow finding out the PIN value. One can see that passive eavesdropper 
would have an almost impossible time trying to obtain these values so that he 
could put them into the Hash function to get the link key. 
An active eavesdropping attack has a better chance of success than a 
passive one but still will have a difficult time. The success of the active 
eavesdropping attack will mainly depend on the attacker being able to get the 
right value for the message digest. Since the value of H and e is exchanged prior 
to PIN entry is extremely difficult for the attacker to retrieve these. Even if the 
attacker can somehow obtain these values, the attacker has to be anticipating 
when the devices will choose to make a connection. But since the attacker is 
focusing on the Bluetooth exchange it will be difficult to obtain the public keys and 
H. The attacker will intercept the message being sent from BD1 to BD2 which 
contains the value of C. Now the attacker needs to ensure that the value of C it 
will send to BD2 has the same MAC value as H using K as the key. The attacker 
will have no knowledge of the values of H or K making it very unlikely he/she can 
produce a C having the same message digest value. If the attacker sends an 
incorrect value of C to BD2 then it will cause BD2 to shut down the key exchange 
because it will know someone is altering the messages. If the attacker does find 
out the value of C then there is still the problem of finding the PIN and the 
initialization key. In order for an active eavesdropping attack to succeed, the 
attacker will need to find out all of these values, which will make it quite difficult 
as shown in the discussion above. 
The bluedumping attack is somewhat of a combination between passive 
and active eavesdropping. An attacker will send a message to a Bluetooth device 
pretending to be another device and claiming to have lost the link key the devices 
shared. This will force the two devices to reinitiate the link key exchange [21]. 
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However, once the two devices start the key exchange, the attacker becomes a 
passive eavesdropper and therefore can only listen to the messages being sent. 
Again the two devices will exchange values prior to PIN entry using their 
interfaces and in some cases may not need to exchange these values if they do 
not wish to renew them. The attacker now faces the same problems as the 
passive eavesdropping attack and therefore it will be highly unlikely that the 
attacker can obtain the link key in the end. 
As one can see, the Unbalanced RSA enhanced Bluetooth key exchange 
protocol has not lost any security features when compared to the enhanced 
Diffie-Hellman Key exchange protocol. Both protocols can fend off the three main 
key exchange attacks by using their public-key systems and hash functions. In 
the simulation section, Unbalanced RSA and Diffie-Hellman will be compared to 
see if the proposed protocol can outperform the DH protocol in terms of 
computation time. 
5.3 Comparing the Three Protocols 
Table 5.2 compares the original Bluetooth key exchange, the Diffie-
Hellman protocol and the proposed protocol ("Unbalanced RSA") in several 
different areas. 
The first row compares the three protocols in terms of their security 
strength. When the description of the original key exchange scheme was given it 
was shown how it is quite susceptible to the common attacks of passive 
eavesdropping, active eavesdropping, and bluedumping [16]. On the other hand 
the Diffie-Hellman [23] and proposed protocols were shown to have very high 
security against these attacks by using one-way cryptographic functions and 
hash functions. Therefore, the security strength of the original scheme is low 
while the other two protocols have high security strength. 
The entities that are kept secret by each protocol also differ. The original 
scheme will keep only the PIN as the secret everything else will be sent to the 
other device in plaintext. The Diffie-Hellman protocol will keep the PIN secret as 
well as the shared secret key S using Diffie-Hellman. This protocol will also keep 
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the message digest a secret along with the key used to create it. The 
"Unbalanced RSA" protocol will keep the PIN secret as well as the key 
exchanged using RSA, just like the Diffie-Hellman protocol the message digest 























Table 5.2: Comparing three key exchange protocols 
The computation time will be related to how difficult the computations are 
for each protocol. The original scheme has relatively simple computations. In the 
original key exchange scheme only symmetric ciphers are used, more specifically 
SAFER+. SAFER+ was a candidate for the advanced encryption standard (AES) 
eventually losing out to Rjindael after three years of testing [38]. The reason for 
the use of SAFER+ was its practical implementation in hardware [39]. The Diffie-
Hellman protocol will have a relatively high computation time because of all the 
modular exponentiations being done on both sides. In the case of the DH 
enhanced protocol it would require four modular exponentiations in the entire 
protocol all with the same size modulus [25]. The proposed protocol should be 
closer to the original scheme in terms of computation time. The encryption and 
decryption portion of the protocol should take the most time. Usually encryption is 
much faster than decryption in RSA however, with the "Unbalanced RSA" version 
the decryption time will be considerably smaller and should make the 
computation time adequate. If one of the devices in a Bluetooth communication is 
a much smaller processor the Diffie-Hellman protocol would cause an even larger 
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delay, the Unbalanced RSA protocol can cure that problem. The Diffie-Hellman 
protocol and the proposed protocol will be simulated for the computation time. 




Figure 5.3: Original BT key exchange messages 
The last comparison between these three protocols is made in terms of the 
protocol steps. In the original protocol only 3 messages are exchanged between 
the two Bluetooth devices during the key exchange as shown in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.3 shows the number of messages needed to be exchanged in the 
proposed protocol using "Unbalanced RSA". The diagram shows that the 
proposed protocol only uses 3 messages as well, same as the original Bluetooth 
key exchange scheme. The proposed protocol is therefore increasing the security 
from the original Bluetooth key exchange protocol without changing the number 
of protocol steps needed. 
Figure 5.4 shows that the Diffie-Hellman protocol requires 4 messages to 
be exchanged, in order to complete the protocol. The Proposed protocol requires 
only 3 messages as can be seen in Figure 5.3 to be exchanged in order for the 
protocol to be completed. In the end the proposed protocol does not even 
increase the number of protocol steps in order to increase the security, whereas 
the Diffie-Hellman protocol increases the security same as the proposed protocol 
but needs to add one extra protocol step. Although this may not make a huge 
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difference in the overall design of the key exchange it does increase the 
complexity and will also increase the overall delay of the process. 
BT Device 1 BT Device 2 
BD2 sends IDBD2 
* 
BD1 sends C, IDBD1 
2 • 
BD2 sends (K' XOR 
H' XOR IDBD2) 
4 
Figure 5.4: Enhanced "Unbalanced RSA" Key Exchange Messages 
BT Device 1 BT Device 2 
BD2 sends IDBD2 
« 




BD2 sends gy, EK>(S, 
IDBD2) 
4 
Figure 5.5: Enhanced Diffie-Hellman Key exchange messages 
Comparing these three key exchange protocol in these four fields shows 
how successful they are. The "Unbalanced RSA" protocol is better than the Diffie-
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Hellman protocol in terms computation time, and the number of protocol steps. 
These two protocols do however provide high security strength and have the 
same number of secret entities. The Unbalanced RSA protocol provides higher 
security strength than the original key exchange scheme and also keeps more 
entities a secret. They both have an adequate computation time and the same 
number of protocol steps. The only area where the Unbalanced RSA protocol 
would suffer is when it is compared to the original key exchange in terms of how 
complex the operations are in each protocol because the proposed protocol uses 
a public-key system, whereas the original scheme uses a much simpler 
symmetric cipher. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced the new protocol using the "Unbalanced RSA" 
Algorithm. The goal of the proposed protocol was similar to that of applying 
Unbalanced RSA to WLAN [35], [36], which was to improve security while trying 
to minimize delay. The proposed protocol provides better security features than 
the original scheme when related to the common key exchange attacks. The 
proposed protocol also improves the previously discussed Diffie-Hellman protocol 
by having a lower computation time. This protocol will require each user to 
perform only one modular exponentiation. Also the powerful processor can take 
care of the encryption because it has to handle the entire modulus while the other 
processor can take care of the decryption because it only needs to handle the 
prime factor, p. The next chapter will compare the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the 
proposed protocol, and an RSA protocol in terms of their time delay. As the 
complexity of the operations in the protocol and the computation time are related, 
some vital information should be obtained from the simulations run on these key 
exchange protocols. 
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6. Simulation Results and Analysis 
The simulation was performed to check and see how long each protocol 
would take to go through its phases. Simulation results were performed on the 
Diffie-Hellman protocol, the "Unbalanced RSA" protocol, and a protocol exactly 
the same as the proposed protocol but using RSA. The simulation was performed 
for modulus sizes of 1024 bits and 2048 bits. In the URSA protocol, the size of p 
when n is 1024 bits was 256 bits, making q 768 bits. When n was 2048 bits, the 
size of p was 512 bits, making q 1536 bits. The reason for choosing these values 
was because as shown in [32], [33] they should be secure for the foreseeable 
future. The modular exponentiation was performed using the square-and-multiply 
method as it is one of the most popular methods to use. Simulation was 
performed using MAPLE version 11 on a laptop with a core duo processor with a 
2GB RAM and 2GHz clock frequency. The codes for the simulations are provided 
in the appendices along with comments to explain how they work. 
6.1 Simulation Results 
The simulation results were performed in phases as shown in the 
diagrams for the protocols earlier. In the Diffie-Hellman protocol phase 1 consists 
of a modular exponentiation and a MAC function; Phase 2 consists of two 
modular exponentiations and two hash functions; and finally Phase 3 consists of 
two hash functions. In the RSA/Unbalanced RSA protocol Phase 1 consists of an 
encryption operation and a MAC function; Phase 2 consists of a decryption 
operation, a MAC function, and two hash functions; and lastly Phase 3 consists of 
two hash functions. 
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The results for the running time of these phases are shown in Table 
6.1(n=1024 bits) and Table 6.2(n=2048 bits). The results show the amount of 
time taken to perform calculations for the entire phase and in brackets it shows 
how much of the time of the phase is consumed by the main operation, which in 
these cases was the modular exponentiation. These results will be discussed in 
























































Table 6.2: Delay for DH, RSA, and URSA schemes (n=2048 bits) 
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By looking at the results in the two tables above, one can clearly see the 
advantages "Unbalanced RSA" has over the other two protocols. As explained in 
the chapter on "Unbalanced RSA", decreasing the size of one factor does not 
compromise the security of the algorithm and therefore the tables provide an 
accurate way to compare the protocols [28]. The calculations in each phase were 
explained earlier and by looking at the results one can see that Unbalanced RSA 
is clearly superior to the other two algorithms when it comes to computation time. 
The Diffie-Hellman protocol is clearly the least efficient protocol for either 
modulus size. The amount of time it takes in each phase is much greater than 
that of RSA or "Unbalanced RSA". The comparison of RSA and "Unbalanced 
RSA" is a little bit tricky as in both protocols; Phase 1 and Phase 3 delays are 
exactly the same. Phase 1 and Phase 3 is where the encryption and hash 
functions take place. However, when looking at phase 2, Unbalanced RSA's 
efficiency is much greater than that of RSA. Taking all these results into account, 
one can say the "Unbalanced RSA" is the best choice when one needs a 
combination of security and efficiency. 
6.2 Analysis of Results 
The simulation results can be tested by comparing them with Shamir's 
discovery that the time delay of a RSA computations grows cubically with the size 
of the modulus [28]. Table 6.3 shows the results for the encryption process and 
how their time delay ratio compares to that of Shamir's theory. First of all one 
should take note that the table shows RSA and Unbalanced RSA have the same 
time delay. This is not an error because as mentioned earlier, the encryption 
operation does not change between RSA and "Unbalanced RSA". In theory, 
when the size of the modulus changes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits, the time delay 
should be about (2048/1024 )3=8 times slower. As the table shows the tested time 
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Table 6.3: Encryption time delay and ratio (RSA and URSA schemes) 
Table 6.4 shows the results of the decryption process and compares the results 
to Shamir's theory. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, when the 
modulus is 1024 bits, the p value for URSA is 256 bits, and when the modulus is 
2048 bits, the p value for URSA is 512 bits. According to Shamir, when n is 1024 
bits, Unbalanced RSA decryption should be (1024/256)3=64 times faster than that 
of RSA. In the simulation, results showed Unbalanced RSA to be 63 time faster 
than RSA. When n is 2048 bits Unbalanced RSA decryption should also be 
(2048/512)3=64 times faster than that of RSA. In the simulation, with modulus 
being 2048 bits, results showed Unbalanced RSA decryption to be 59 times 
faster than RSA. By looking at these results and comparing them to Shamir's 
















Table 6.4: Decryption time delay and ratio (RSA and URSA schemes) 
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6.3 Summary 
This chapter displayed and analyzed the results achieved when the Diffie-
Hellman protocol, the proposed protocol, and the RSA protocol were simulated. 
By looking at the results it is clear to see that the proposed protocol that uses 
Unbalanced RSA has the lowest computation time. The differential between the 
proposed protocol and the Diffie-Hellman protocol is enormous whereas 
differential between the proposed protocol and RSA is smaller. This is due to the 
fact that the only difference that occurs between the proposed protocol and the 
RSA protocol is in Phase 2 of the protocol (decryption). Even with this fact, by 
looking at just the phase 2 portion of the simulation Unbalanced RSA is much 
better than the RSA protocol. The results were validated by showing that they 
adhere to Shamir's theory that the RSA computation time is proportional to the 
size of the modulus cubed. The results presented in this chapter were obtained 
on a laptop and should be considered useful for Bluetooth on laptops only. The 
use of the proposed protocols on handhelds would require further investigation 
and testing. The next chapter will state some conclusions to the thesis and also 
discuss some future work that could be considered for this area. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this thesis, the problems with IEEE 802.15 standard in terms of key 
exchange have been reviewed. New suggestions to the key exchange scheme 
and their problems have also been reviewed. The problem of exchanging keys 
reliably in a Bluetooth network is very critical. The IEEE standard key exchange 
tends to have several security issues when it comes to common attacks 
(passive/active eavesdropping, bluedumping). The Enhancement to the key 
exchange which uses Diffie-Hellman [23] aimed to help fix these security issues. 
The Enhancement using Diffie-Hellman however also had its own problems with 
computation time and complex calculations. 
In order to find a middle ground between security and efficiency between 
two Bluetooth devices, a new protocol is proposed here for Bluetooth key 
exchange. The proposed protocol uses a modified version of RSA called 
"Unbalanced RSA". If Unbalanced RSA is used, the goal of providing security and 
efficiency can be achieved. By using Unbalanced RSA the computation time can 
be reduced because in this algorithm the decryption process is done modulo p, 
not modulo n as in regular RSA. This fact alone should greatly improve its 
efficiency over the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The changing of the modulus for 
decryption can affect the security level if one is not careful. There are certain 
conditions that need to be met in order for Unbalanced RSA to have the same 
security level as regular RSA. 
Even though Unbalanced RSA reduces the size of the prime factor p and 
uses it as the modulus for decryption, this does not decrease the security level 
when compared to normal RSA. A modulus can be divided up into its factors 
using two different types of algorithms. The first is dependent upon the size of the 
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factored number n and the other is dependent upon the size of the factors. Since 
the size of n does not change from RSA to Unbalanced RSA, the first type of 
algorithm will not make a difference. The second type of algorithm has only found 
factors up to 67 digits so far [32] and is estimated to find 85 digits in the year 
2018 [33]. Looking at these facts it is safe to assume that a p size of 256 bits is 
still safe for a few years and if needed can even be increased slightly when it is 
needed. 
By using detailed descriptions and simulations, it was shown that the 
proposed protocol using Unbalanced RSA is the best combination of security and 
efficiency out of the three protocols. It was shown that the original Bluetooth key 
exchange was susceptible to the common key exchange attacks whereas the two 
modified version could defend against these attacks. So the original scheme was 
deemed to be insecure when compared to the enhanced schemes. The Diffie-
Hellman enhanced protocol and the Unbalanced RSA enhanced protocol were 
simulated to check their computation time. At the end, the Unbalanced RSA 
protocol was better in terms of computation time than the Diffie-Hellman protocol. 
In summary, the proposed key exchange protocol using Unbalanced RSA 
was able to increase the security strength when compared to the original 
Bluetooth key exchange. It was also able to decrease the computation time when 
compared to the enhanced Diffie-Hellman Key exchange. The use of 
cryptographic one-way functions and hash functions allows the Unbalanced RSA 
key exchange to provide high security against the common key exchange 
attacks. The Diffie-Hellman enhanced protocol and the proposed protocol using 
Unbalanced RSA are quite similar in terms of their layout. However, a closer look 
reveals that the DH enhanced protocol requires twice as many modular 
exponentiations than the proposed protocol. Also, one can see the Unbalanced 
RSA enhancement keeps the same number of protocol steps as the original key 
exchange whereas the DH enhancement increases the number of protocol steps. 
The proposed protocol turns out to be a suitable replacement to the 
original key exchange scheme and to the Diffie-Hellman enhanced key exchange 
protocol. The proposed protocol did perform up to the expectations on the laptop 
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on which it was simulated. The results obtained from the simulation are relevant 
to laptops and cannot easily be converted to results on handheld processors. It 
would be a good idea to implement this proposed protocol on different types of 
processors so that it can be seen if this protocol as efficient for other types of 
processors. It would be wise to include various types of commercially available 
processors for handheld devices as well as other devices, as a greater number of 
handhelds come equipped with Bluetooth. The use of elliptic curve cryptography 
in Bluetooth security should also be explored. These suggestions can be treated 
as future work after this thesis. 
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Appendix A: Maple code for BT 
Key Exchange using URSA 
A.1 : System Setup 
M1 := (rand(2A256))(); 
M2 := (rand(2A768))(); 
P := nextprime(MI); 
Q := nextprime(M2); 
n := P*Q; 
n2:=(P-1)*(Q-1); 
e :=2 1 e +1 ; 
isprime(e); 
gcd(e,n2); 
d := eval(1/e mod n2); 
IDBD1 := (rand(2A48))(); 
IDBD2 := (rand(2A48))(); 
A.2: Phase 1 Testing 
st := time(): 
fori from 0 by 1 to 100 do 
K:=(rand(2A128))(); 
C := K&Ae mod n; 
end do; 
time()-st 
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 1 of the proposed scheme 100 
times. He result obtained from this must be divided by 100 to get the actual result 
to run phase 1 once. Phase 1 includes 1 exponentiation and 2 random number 
generations. 
// generates random integer of size 256 bits 
// generates random integer of size 768 bits 
//finds next prime number after M1 
// finds next prime number after M2 
//Multiplies P and Q to obtain modulus n 
//generates the toitent function 
// sets public key value 
// check to make sure e is prime 
//check to see if e is relatively prime to n2 
//evaluate value of d using modular arithmetic 
// address for Bluetooth device 1 
// address for Bluetooth device 2 
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A.3: Phase 2 Testing 
st := time(): 
with(StringTools): 
for i from 0 by 1 to 75 do 
C := K&Ae mod p; 
K' = Hash(K); 
KLink = Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1 ,IDBD2); 
end do; 
time()-st 
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 2 of the proposed scheme 75 
times. Since the decryption process will take longer than the encryption we used 
a smaller loop. Phase 2 includes 1 exponentiation and 2 hash functions. 
A.4: Phase 3 Testing 
st := time(): 
with(StringTools): 
for i from 0 by 1 to 1000 do 
K" := Hash(K); 
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1,IDBD2); 
end do; 
time()-st 
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 3 of the proposed scheme 1000 
times. We needed to greatly increase the size of the loop because the hash 
functions take very little time to execute. Phase 3 includes 2 hash functions. 
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Appendix B: Maple code for BT 
Key Exchange using RSA 
B.1: System Setup 
M1 := (rand(2A512))(); 
M2 := (rand(2A512))(); 
P := nextprime(MI); 
Q := nextprime(M2); 
n := P*Q; 
n2:=(P-1)*(Q-1); 
e :=2 l 6 + 1; 
isprime(e); 
gcd(e,n2); 
d := eval(1/e mod n2); 
IDBD1 := (rand(2M8))(); 
IDBD2 := (rand(2A48))(); 
B.2: Phase 1 Testing 
st := time(): 
fori from 0 by 1 to 100 do 
K := (rand(2A128))(); 
C := K&Ae mod n; 
end do; 
time()-st 
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 1 of the RSA key exchange 
scheme 100 times. The result obtained from this must be divided by 100 to get 
the actual result to run phase 1 once. Phase 1 includes 1 exponentiation and 2 
random number generations. 
// generates random integer of size 256 bits 
// generates random integer of size 768 bits 
//finds next prime number after M1 
// finds next prime number after M2 
//Multiplies P and Q to obtain modulus n 
//generates the toitent function 
// sets public key value 
// check to make sure e is prime 
//check to see if e is relatively prime to n2 
//evaluate value of d using modular arithmetic 
// address for Bluetooth device 1 
// address for Bluetooth device 2 
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B.3: Phase 2 Testing 
st := time(): 
with(StringTools): 
for i from 0 by 1 to 20 do 
K := C&Ad mod n; 
K' := Hash(K); 
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1,IDBD2); 
end do; 
time()-st 
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 2 of the RSA Key exchange 
scheme 20 times. Since the decryption process will take longer than the 
encryption we used a smaller loop. Phase 2 includes 1 exponentiation and 2 
hash functions. 
B.4: Phase 3 Testing 
st := time(): 
with(StringTools): 
for i from 0 by 1 to 1000 do 
K' := Hash(K); 
KLink:= Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1 JDBD2); 
end do; 
time()-st 
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 3 of the RSA key exchange 
scheme 1000 times. We needed to greatly increase the size of the loop because 
the hash functions take very little time to execute. Phase 3 includes 2 hash 
functions. 
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Appendix C: Maple code for BT 
Key Exchange using DH 
C.1: System Setup 
q1 := (rand(2A1024))(); //generates random 1024 bit number 
q := nextprime(q1) // next prime number after q1 for 
modulus 
XA := (rand(2A512))(); //generates user A private key 
XB := (rand(2A512))(); //generates user B private key 
IDBD1 := (rand(2A48))(); //User A address 
IDBD2 := (rand(2A48))(); //User B address 
for g from 50 to 1000 while a <> q-1 do //selects range from which to get g 
with(numtheory); 
i := order(g, q); //finds the proper g as primitive root 
g; //displays alpha value 
end do; 
C.2: Phase 1 Testing 
st := time(): 
fori from 0 by 1 to 100 do 
XA:=(rand(2A512))(); 




This code will run Phase 1 of the enhanced security using DH. This loop 
calculates the time needed to run this phase 100 times. Phase 1 includes 2 
random number generations and 1 exponentiation. 
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C.3: Phase 2 Testing 
st := time(): 
with(StringTools): 
for i from 0 by 1 to 20 do 
YA:=(rand(2A512))(); 
YB := ALPHA&AXB mod q; 
S := YB&AXA mod q; 
K' = Hash(S); 
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,S,IDBD1,IDBD2); 
end do; 
time()-st 
This code will run Phase 2 of the enhanced security using DH. This loop 
calculates the time needed to run this phase 20 times. Phase 2 includes 2 
exponentiations, 1 random number generation and 2 hash functions. 
C.4: Phase 3 Testing 
st := time(): 
with(StringTools): 
for i from 0 by 1 to 100 do 
YA := (rand(2A512))(); 
S := YA&AXB mod q; 
K' = Hash(S); 
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,S,IDBD1,IDBD2); 
end do; 
time()-st 
This code will run Phase 3 of the enhanced security using DH. This loop 
calculates the time needed to run this phase 100 times. Phase 3 includes 1 
exponentiation and 2 Hash functions. 
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